INTRODUCTION
It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspi cious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no vio lence or threats of it.
One afternoon, a police officer spots a man driving a Cadillac through a run·down neighborhood.2 His interest piqued, the officer decides to follow the vehicle. The Cadillac soon comes to rest in front of an apartment building, and the driver, Jimmy Barrios·Moriera, re· moves a shopping bag from the trunk and enters the building. The moment Barrios·Moriera disappears within the doorway, the officer sprints after him because he knows that the door to the apartment building will automatically lock when it closes. He manages to catch the door just in time and rushes in. Barrios·Moriera is already halfway up a flight of stairs in the common hallway and ignores the police offi· cer when he identifies himself and indicates a desire to speak with him. Barrios·Moriera continues up the stairs and sets his shopping bag on the floor beside him as he hurriedly tries to open his door. The police officer sprints up the stairs after him and arrives before Barrios· Moriera can do so. He thrusts his hand into Barrios·Moriera's bag and withdraws a rectangular·shaped object wrapped in tape. He then or· ders Barrios·Moriera to go into his apartment, where he arrests him for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
If this story unfolded in the Second, Seventh, Eighth, or Ninth Circuits, Barrios·Moriera would have no constitutional basis for com· plaint.3 Each of these circuits refuses to recognize that a tenant has a reasonable expectation of privacy within the locked common areas of an apartment building for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.4 The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, stands alone5 in maintaining that a [Vol. 101:273 able searches and seizures."12 This protection of the person extends to the guilty and the innocent alike,'3 but the question that remains is precisely what degree of protection the Fourth Amendment affords.
The answer to this question is found by an application of what has come to be known as the Katz test.14 Justice Harlan first articulated this test in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,15 where he stated, "there is a twofold requirement [for Fourth Amendment pro tection], first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) ex pectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that so ciety is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "16 In Katz , the Court held that the FBI's use of an electronic listening device attached to the outside of a telephone booth violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment privacy rights.17 In so holding, the Court abandoned the traditional "trespass" doctrine upon which prior Fourth Amendment questions had tumed. 18 The Supreme Court subsequently adopted and refined Justice Harlan's standard as the binding test in Fourth Amendment cases. 19 Consequently, in every Fourth Amendment case, the Court first seeks to determine whether a person had, or should have had, an actual 19. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) ("First, we ask whether the indi vidual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; that is, whether he has shown that he sought to preserve something as private .... Second, we inquire whether the individual's expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reason able.'') (internal citations and quotations omitted); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) ("The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a 'constitu tionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' ") (citing Karz , 389 U.S. at 516 (Harlan subjective expectation of privacy.20 The Court will then consider whether that expectation was reasonable under the circumstances. 21 This Note contends that the police practice of entering the locked common areas of apartment buildings without permission or a warrant violates the Constitution. Part I examines the conflicting approaches adopted by the circuit courts in this area and argues that the approach adopted by the majority of circuits is flawed.22 Part II argues that in terpreting the Fourth Amendment to protect tenants' privacy expecta tions within the locked common areas of their apartment buildings is most consistent with Supreme Court precedent in other Fourth Amendment cases. Part III argues that this broad interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is necessitated by the history of that Amendment and by the intent of the Framers. Part IV argues that a consideration of tenants' legitimate privacy interests, coupled with a respect for the rule of law, demands that the Court extend the protections of the Fourth Amendment to cover the locked common areas of multi-unit apartment buildings. This Note concludes that the Supreme Court should resolve this circuit split, which threatens the privacy and secu rity of a large portion of the American population, by extending Fourth Amendment protection in the locked common area context.
I. E XAMINING C IRCUIT C ASE L AW
This Part critiques the conflicting approaches adopted by the cir cuit courts in the locked common area context and argues that the Sixth Circuit's approach is superior to that adopted by the majority of circuits. Section I.A argues that the Sixth Circuit's analysis represents a well-reasoned approach to the issue and provides a solid starting point for the Supreme Court's resolution of this Fourth Amendment issue. Section LB argues that the Supreme Court should reject the po sition adopted by the majority of circuits because it is lacking in per suasive authority and meaningful analysis.
20. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43; id. at 741 n.5 (noting that a lack of actual subjec tive expectation is not determinative of the case where one should have an expectation of privacy in a certain area); id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("(W]hether privacy expecta tions are legitimate within the meaning of Katz depends not on the risks an individual can be presumed to accept ... but on the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open society.").
21. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 740; White, 401 U.S. at 752 (determining whether the de fendant's expectation was "justifiable," "reasonable," or "legitimate").
22. "A majority of circuits," as used in this Note, means a majority of the circuits that have addressed the question examined by this Note (that is, the Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits).
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A. The Sixth Circuit Provides a Sound Starting Point
The Sixth Circuit's approach in locked common area cases estab lishes a firm foundation for the Supreme Court's resolution of this im portant constitutional issue. The Sixth Circuit takes a well-reasoned approach in these cases, relying on Supreme Court precedent and carefully considering the subjective expectations of tenants. In United States v. Carriger,23 the Sixth Circuit first considered whether a gov ernment agent's entry, without permission or a warrant, into the locked common areas of an apartment building violated a tenant's Fourth Amendment rights. 24 In holding that such entry violated the defendant's rights, the court took a number of factors into considera tion. First, it noted that Katz expanded the scope of protection offered by the Fourth Amendment.25 Second, it took great care to analyze the facts and holding of Un ited States v. McDonald26 and compare them to the case at hand. In McDonald, the Supreme Court held that police officers' warrantless entry into the locked common areas of a rooming house violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.27 The Sixth Circuit adopted Justice Jackson's explanation of the Court's holding and concluded that, as the facts of McDonald and Carriger differed only in degree but not in kind, McDonald should govern the contro versy before the court.28 The Sixth Circuit noted that although gov ernment entry in Carriger was effected through guile, whereas in McDonald it was by force, this distinction in no way altered the ten ant's subjective expectation of privacy and was therefore irrelevant to the court's Fourth Amendment analysis.29 Finally, the court cited a Louisiana Supreme Court case,30 a Fifth Circuit case,31 and two 23. 541F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976).
24. Carriger, 541 F.2d at 547 (holding "that because the officer did not have probable cause to arrest appellant or his accomplice before he invaded an area where appellant had a legitimate expectation of privacy [the Jocked common hallway of the apartment building], the subsequent arrest and seizure of narcotics were invalid").
25. Id. at 549 (noting that the "Supreme Court's determination that the 'trespass' doc trine could 'no longer be regarded as controlling' was intended to expand the protection af forded by the Fourth Amendment"). This Section criticizes the methodologies and holdings of the ma jority of circuits in locked common area cases and concludes that the Supreme Court should not adopt the position taken by these courts. The majority position is embodied within a long line of cases that stand for the proposition that a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the locked common areas of an apartment building.40 Quantity of cases alone, however, is not enough to establish sound le gal precedent, and all of these cases can be traced back to courts' un supported conclusions or citation to inapposite cases.41 The analysis in these cases does not reflect an effort to establish a consistent test to measure the extent and type of privacy expectations possessed by ten ants,42 and a meaningful application of the two-part Katz test is strangely absent.43 Moreover, with two puzzling exceptions,44 the ma jority of circuits entirely ignore McDonald. Each circuit's faulty analy sis will be examined in turn.
The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit's analysis fails for three reasons. First, the court relies upon unsupported conclusions and citation to inapposite cases. Second, the court fails to apply the Katz test meaningfully in locked common area cases. Third, the court overlooks the fact that the Fourth Amendment's protections are not limited to the home.
The Second Circuit first considered whether a tenant has a reason able expectation of privacy within the locked common areas of his 45 The court concluded that the Fourth Amendment's protections that ensure the security and privacy of a tenant within his apartment do not extend to the lobby of an apartment building that is guarded by a door usually kept locked.46 The court cited no authority for this conclusion.47 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has relied upon this unsupported conclusion as the ba sis for much of its subsequent jurisprudence in this area. 48 Although the genesis of the Second Circuit's case law in the com mon area context preceded Katz,49 neither the Supreme Court's decla ration that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"50 nor the two-part Katz test51 affected the Second Circuit's approach to this issue after Katz hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."59 The court concluded that conversations carried on in a manner that makes them accessible to an individual standing outside a person's apartment are conversations "knowingly exposed to the public."00 The assumption implicit in this conclusion is that the unlocked hallway in this case was a public place in which the police officer had a right to be.
The within the locked common areas of an apartment building, the issue at bar in both pre-Katz cases, met the two-part test set forth in Katz .63 The Penco court failed to distinguish locked common areas from un locked common areas and, instead, assumed that a locked door was irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis.64 Such an assumption is unjustified. In a Katz analysis, the distinction between a locked com mon area and an unlocked common area can play an important role in establishing both a subjective expectation of privacy and the reason ableness of that expectation.65 Accordingly, the Second Circuit's reli ance on Llanes to distinguish Katz in the locked common area context is misplaced.
The Second Circuit unequivocally reaffirmed its position on the locked common area question in United States v. Holland. 66 The court stated, " [I] t is the established law of this Circuit that the common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual ten ant's zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors."67 In reaching this conclusion, the court placed great weight on the fact that the Supreme Court has not recognized common hallways as part of the home for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.68
Even if the Second Circuit is correct in asserting a common hall way is not part of the home for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,69 the court's subsequent conclusion that hallways are automatically out- The Holland court neglected meaningfully to apply the Katz test and, instead, based its reasoning upon an unduly narrow view of the Fourth Amendment that the Supreme Court here rejected in Katz and other cases.73 The court reached its conclusion by relying on cases that either are not on point or lack persuasive authority.74 The Second Circuit continues to adhere to the position it adopted in Holland, paying lip service to Katz while summarily dismissing any claim to pri vacy.75
2.
The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has fared no better in the locked common area context because it relies on inapposite cases and the faulty analy sis of the Second and Eighth Circuits.76 In United States v. ("The Government's principal contention was that 'the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause protects only interests traditionally identified with the home. ' We categorically rejected that contention, relying on the history and text of the Amendment, the policy underlying the warrant requirement, and a line of cases spanning over a century of our jurisprudence.''). Concepcion,77 the court's sole case addressing the precise question of whether a tenant has a constitutionally protected privacy interest within the locked common areas of an apartment building, the court held that a tenant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in these areas.78 The court stated that it was odd to think of an expecta tion of privacy in an entryway, and this view, coupled with the defen dant's inability to exclude absolutely all others from the common areas, led the court to conclude that no Fourth Amendment protection attaches in these types of situations.79 The court justified its holding with citations to two Seventh Circuit cases80 and a combination of Second,81 Fifth,82 and Eighth Circuit83 cases. 78. Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172 (addressing whether police entry into the locked com mon area of the defendant's apartment building was an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
Id.

The court provided the following analysis:
Concepcion could not assert an expectation of 'privacy' in the common area ... because the other five tenants sharing the same entrance used the space and could admit as many guests as they pleased; Concepcion had no expectation that goings-on in the common areas would remain his secret. Indeed, it is odd to think of an expectation of 'privacy' in the entrances to a building .. .. The area outside one's door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside. We think the district court on solid ground in holding that a tenant has no reasonable expec tation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building. F.2d at 990. The court accorded great weight to the fact that the defendant lacked an abso lute subjective expectation of privacy and analogized to the common areas of a locked apartment building before concluding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. It cited Acevedo as its only authority on this ground. Id. cited reveals the court's authority as nothing more than a paper tiger.84 For example, the Seventh Circuit cited a Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Shima,85 in support of the proposition that there is no consti tutionally protected privacy interest within the locked common areas of an apartment building.86 The Seventh Circuit's reliance on Shima, however, was misplaced. The question in that case was whether a per son had a reasonable expectation of privacy in an exterior walkway open and available to the general public; the court did not consider whether such an expectation exists in areas that are enclosed or locked.87
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit avoided any meaningful analysis of two of its past cases whose holdings weighed against the court's newly adopted position. In United States v. Case,88 the Seventh Circuit considered whether the defendants had a right to privacy in a locked common hallway used by only a small number of people. The court found that because the hallway was not a public place, the defendants' privacy interests enjoyed constitutional protection.89 The Case court distinguished Llanes90 on the basis that, while the unlocked hallway in Llanes may have been a "public place," the locked hallway in the case at bar was not.91 Consequently, the court held that the officers' war rantless entry into the locked common area violated the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights. 
The Seventh Circuit reasoned as follows:
Llanes, however, is based upon the finding that the hallway was a public place and that the defendants could hardly expect conversations audible to someone in a public place to be re garded as private. On the contrary, the district judge in this case found that the hallway 'was not such a public area as to entitle the Court to consider it a non-protected area' and we concur. The hallway was kept locked .... The hallway was used by a very confined group, and, most of the time, limited to the proprietors of the stores in the building. held that government officials' warrantless entry into the unlocked, but closed, basement of a commercial building violated the Fourth Amendment. 94 The court disposed of these cases by stating, without any explana tion or justification: "To the extent that United States v. Rosenberg and United States v. Case imply otherwise, they have not survived changes in the Supreme Court's definition of protected privacy interests. "9 5 It is not at all clear why the court asserts that these two cases have not sur vived changes in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and there is little indication that either case has been overruled.96
3.
The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit independently developed its own line of cases in the locked common area context. Its analysis in this area, however, proves little better than that of the circuits discussed above because it relies on the mistaken premise that an absolute right to exclude is nec essary to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. In its seminal case, United States v. Eisler,97 the Eighth Circuit rejected the defen dant's contention that police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered the locked common hallway of his apartment building and eavesdropped outside his door.98 The court invoked the Katz test, but it concluded that the defendant had no legitimate expec tation of privacy within the locked common areas of his apartment building because those areas were open to use by other tenants, their guests, the landlord, and other authorized individuals.99 The court re fused to recognize the defendant's limited privacy interests in these areas as meriting constitutional protection, stating, "An expectation of privacy necessarily implies an expectation that one will be free of any intrusion, not merely unwarranted intrusions."100 The court offered no 94. Rosenberg, 416 F.2d at 682-83 (rejecting the government's argument "that the com mercial nature of the building constituted an implied invitation to enter" and holding that the government agents' entry was unlawful). support for the proposition that an absolute right to exclude is neces sary to establish a protected expectation of privacy.101
The fact that tenants do not have an absolute right to exclude all others from the locked common areas of their buildings should not obliterate their constitutional interests in these areas. Numerous Supreme Court decisions102 affirm the maxim that "[p]rivacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all."103 Rather, the scope of protection offered by the Fourth Amendment is colored in shades of gray. So long as an individual has some expectation of pri vacy, the Court has held that, with few exceptions,104 the government may not tread there without prior approval by a neutral magistrate. 1 0 5 This principle applies with equal force to the locked common areas of apartment buildings. While tenants cannot expect to be free from ob servation by other tenants and their guests, they do expect to be free from the prying senses of trespassers and uninvited strangers.106
While the Supreme Court has been unwilling to find a Fourth Amendment violation where government agents make an observation from an area where anyone has a right to be,107 it has continued to rec- Ortega,109 for example, the Court held that a government employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, even though "it is the nature of government offices that others -such as fellow employ ees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public -may have frequent access to an individual's office."110 Again in Chapman v. Un ited States,111 the Court held that government agents' search of a rented house violated the tenant's Fourth Amendment rights even though the landlord had authority to enter the house for some pur poses.112 As Justice Scalia insightfully pointed out, the Fourth Amendment protects privacy, not solitude.113 While landlords and ten ants may invite police officers into the locked common areas of their buildings without infringing on other tenants' reasonable expectation of privacy, this fact should not justify unauthorized, warrantless gov ernment intrusion into areas from which the public is excluded.114 The any member of the public could have lawfully observed the defendants' properties by flying overhead, the defendants' expectations of privacy were not ones that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. The questions in those cases differ in one material respect from the question presented by the controversy under discussion here. Those cases were decided on the basis that "any member of the public" had a right to be in the airspace above the defen dants' property and could have seen what the officers saw. The locked common areas of apartment buildings, on the other hand, are not open to "any member of the public;" rather, they are exclusive in nature and have been reasonably secured against unauthorized entry.
108. Some circuit courts claim that United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), holds that the hallways of apartment buildings are public places. See, e.g., United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Santana as supporting the proposition that "[t]he hallway of an apartment building, as with the threshold of one's dwelling, is a 'public' place for purposes of interpreting the Fourth Amendment"). Contrary to this claim, Santana did not hold that the hallway of an apartment building is a public place and there fore outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Santana concerned "hot pursuit," and the Court held that a suspect could not defeat an arrest commenced in a public place -the threshold of the defendant's house -by retreating within. It made no statement about hall ways, locked or otherwise. The leap from a threshold to interior hallways is unwarranted, especially when one considers the factors that led the Court to conclude that the threshold is a public place. A threshold, where a person is "not merely visible to the public but [is] ex posed to public view, speech, hearing and touch as if ... standing completely outside her house," Santana, 427 U.S. at 42, is materially different than an interior hallway of an apart ment complex, especially a locked hallway. There, a tenant is not even visible to the public, let alone exposed to public speech, hearing, or touch. locked common areas of apartment buildings are not open to "any member of the public;" rather they are exclusive in nature and merit recognition by society as an area in which a tenant has a legitimate, al though limited, expectation of privacy.115 This is especially true given the fact that these locked areas are in close proximity to tenants' homes. 116 Contrary to what some courts suggest, there is not a parallel line of Supreme Court precedent standing for the proposition that an expec tation of privacy is violated only if the place is one that the defendant has the right to keep subject to his exclusive control.117 In Rakas v. lllinois,118 the Supreme Court pointed to the passengers' inability to exclude others as one of many factors that established that the defen dants did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in an automo bile in which they had neither a property nor possessory interest.119 The Court did not state that an absolute right to exclude is necessary to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy; rather, it pointed 'to the defendants' complete inability to exclude.120 Moreover, the Court highlighted the fact that the def endants "made no showing that they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or the area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passen gers."121 Tenants in an apartment building are in a materially different position than the passengers in Rakas. They do have the right to ex clude those who have not been invited in by other tenants or the landlord, and they do have an interest in the privacy and security of observes furnishes no justification for federal agents to enter a place of business from which the public is restricted and to conduct their own warrantless search." Id. their apartment buildings.122 Consequently, tenants' incomplete right to exclude is no reason for courts to deny their constitutional claims.
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed Eisler,123 and al though the court has recently shown a willingness to apply the Katz test meaningfully in locked common area cases,124 the court's holding in Eisler remains good law.125 As that holding is based upon a mistaken premise, namely that an absolute right to exclude is a necessary pre requisite for Fourth Amendment protection, it should be rejected.
4.
Th e Ninth Circuit
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's resolution of the locked common areas question is also unsatisfactory. In Un ited States v. Nohara,126 the court refused to recognize a defendant's privacy interest in the locked hall way outside his apartment. In refusing to recognize this interest, the court relied upon dicta from one of its earlier cases,127 cited an inappo site case,128 and relied upon the faulty reasoning of the Second129 and tenant in a duplex has a reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas shared only by the duplex's tenants and the landlord) . The court invoked the Katz test and disposed of the case after it determined that the defendant had no sul;>jective expectation of privacy on the particular set of facts presented in this case . Id. at 933. In evaluating the defendant's claim, the court looked to several factors: "whether the party has a possessory interest in the things seized or the place searched; whether the party can exclude others from that place; whether the party took precautions to maintain the privacy; and whether the party had a key to the premises ." Id. The court concluded that the defendant had no subjective expectation of pri vacy in this case because he disavowed any possessory interests in the material, had not tried to exclude anyone, and had taken no steps to maintain privacy in that area. Id. Eighth Circuits.130 The court noted the Sixth Circuit's holding in Carriger131 but summarily rejected it.132 Finally, the Ninth Circuit joined the Eighth in stating that an absolute right to exclude is a pre condition for a constitutionally recognizable expectation of privacy.133
In addition to the problems noted above, the Ninth Circuit also failed adequately to address United States v. Fluker, 134 an earlier Ninth Circuit case holding that a tenant had a reasonable expectation of pri vacy in the locked hallway outside his apartment.135 The court brushed that case aside by noting that Fluker was limited to its facts. The court also pointed out that the apartment in Fluker was only one of two basement apartments, not an apartment in a multi-unit complex.136 The court did not, however, discuss why the distinction between the two types of common areas should make a difference f o r constitu tional purposes, nor did it explain why the absence of an absolute right to exclude was not determinative in Fl uker, whereas the same condi tion barred the defendant's claim in the case at bar.
II. BROADLY INTERPRETING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IS CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the precise question of whether a tenant has a reasonable expectation of privacy within the locked common areas of an apartment complex. This Part argues, however, that a fair reading of relevant Supreme Court precedent de mands that the provisions of the Fourth Amendment be interpreted to protect tenants' expectations of privacy within these areas. Section II.A argues that Justice Jackson's concurrence in McDonald should govern the current controversy. Section 11.B argues that the Supreme Court's commitment to protecting privacy interests in and around the home calls for an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that pro- 135. Flu ker, 543 F.2d at 716 (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy because "the entry way was one to which access was clearly limited as a matter of right to the occupants of the two basement apartments, and it is undisputed that the outer doorway was always locked and that only the occupants of the two apartments and the landlord had keys thereto").
136. Nohara, 3 F.3d at 1242 (declining to extend Fluker because the Fluker Court lim ited that case to its facts).
tects tenants from unauthorized, warrantless searches by government agents in locked common areas.
A. McDonald v. United States Should Govern the Current
Controversy
The best reading of McDonald137 reveals that a tenant does have a constitutionally protected privacy interest within the locked common areas of his apartment building. At issue in that case was whether police officers violated the defendant's right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure when they entered the locked com mon area of his rooming house without a search warrant.138 Police officers peered into the defendant's room from the locked common areas of the rooming house, which they entered by prying open a window.139 The officers arrested the defendant and searched his room after observing, from their position within the hallway, the defendant engaged in illegal activity within his room.140 The Court found for the defendant, stating, "Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police."141 As the police claimed no emergency in this case, the Court concluded that faithful adherence to constitutional principles would not tolerate the absence of a search warrant.142
There are three possible interpretations of the Court's holding in this case.143 First, McDonald can be seen as a condemnation of the of ficers' presence in the locked common area as a violation of the de fendant's Fourth Amendment right to privacy. Second, looking only to the language of the Court's opinion, McDonald can be seen as merely condemning the government's failure to secure a warrant given the circumstances of the case. 
The following passage is illustrative:
We will not assume that where a defendant has been under surveillance for months, no search warrant could have been obtained .... Moreover, when we move to the scene of the crime, the reason for the absence of a search warrant is even less obvious. When the officers heard the adding machine and, at the latest, when they saw what was transpiring in the room, they certainly had adequate grounds for seeking a search warrant. Justice Jackson explained the Court's holding in this first manner in his concurring opinion.146 His opinion constitutes the best reading of this case because it explains the Court's holding in a way that makes it both internally consistent and harmonious with the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Consequently, the Supreme Court should recognize Justice Jackson's concurrence as authoritative and should recognize a tenant's expectation of privacy within the locked common areas of an apartment building as legitimate.
Justice Jackson saw the case before the Court as raising the issue of whether police officers violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to privacy and security when they entered the locked hallway from which they observed the defendant's illegal ac tivity.147 He concluded that "each tenant of a building, while he has no right to exclude from the common hallways those who enter lawfully, does have a personal and constitutionally protected interest in the in tegrity and security of the entire building against unlawful breaking and entry."148 Justice Jackson explained that a tenant's constitutionally protected interests should not vanish merely because the unlawful breaking and entering comes at the hands of government agents.149 This rationale applies with equal force in the setting of the locked common areas of apartment buildings. The only difference between the facts presented in McDonald and the controversy under discussion here is that one setting was a rooming house while the other is an apartment building.150 As such, courts should recognize tenants' expec tations of privacy within the locked common areas of their apartment buildings.
An alternative reading of McDonald views that case as merely condemning the government agents' failure to secure a warrant where it was practical for them to do so. This reading is unsatisfactory, how ever, because it does not comport with the Supreme Court's holdings 148. Id. at 458; see also id. at 459 (noting that the police "were guilty of breaking and entering -a felony in law and a crime far more serious than the one they were engaged in suppressing"). The Fourth Amendment has never required a law enforcement of ficer to avert his eyes when passing by a home.155 This principle has been interpreted broadly, so that even when government agents pass by a home in an unusual manner, so long as there is a public right to be there, no constitutional complaint will be heard.156 There is no question that, in this case, the officers in the hallway observed the de fendant engaged in illegal activity.157 Furthermore, it is well settled that an officer has the right to arrest a person without a warrant for a crime committed in his presence. 
The Court's approach here is clear:
The Fourth Amendment ... has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an offi cer's observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible. [Vol. 101:273 cash, adding machines, and gambling slips were clearly visible in the room. 160 The language of the opinion also seems to indicate that had the landlady independently admitted the officers, the def e ndant would have had no valid constitutional complaint.161 This conclusion seems inconsistent with the lack of a warrant as the sole basis for the Court's opinion; even if the officers had obtained permission, they still would have failed to obtain a warrant where it was practical for them to do so. A narrow reading of McDonald is further undermined in light of the Supreme Court's declaration that "the reasonableness of a search does not depend upon the practicability of obtaining a search war rant."162 Taken together, these factors indicate that the holding in McDonald must be seen as embracing more than a condemnation of the government's failure to obtain a warrant in this particular case.
Other courts agree that McDonald is broader than a mere con demnation of the government's failure to get a warrant, but they seek to limit that case to a condemnation of violent police entry into the locked common areas of apartment buildings or rooming houses.163 A distinction on this basis, however, is improper. If government agents violated McDonald's constitutionally protected expectation of privacy and security by violently entering the locked common areas, it is un clear why these same interests would not be violated if the officers en ter through guile as in Carriger. Likewise, if a tenant relies upon the privacy and security offered by a locked door, it is hard to imagine that he will be concerned about whether police officers breach these interests by blowing a hole in the door or by sneaking through it when no one is looking. It is the presence of a trespassing government agent that is of concern here, and not the manner in which the agent came to be on the premises. This logic is especially clear when one considers that even the law of criminal trespass and burglary does not require force or violence; rather all that is required is unlawful entry by any means.164 Consequently, the argument for drawing a constitutional dis tinction based upon whether the government agents breached a locked door through violence or through guile should be rejected.
It is no answer to respond that the law already draws a distinction based on a government agent's manner of entry. While it is well set tled that no Fourth Amendment interest is implicated if police officers are admitted to the common areas at the invitation of the landlord or another tenant, 1 65 the issue of illegal police entry is quite different. This distinction is justified both in terms of a tenant's subjective expec tation of privacy and the reasonableness of that expectation.166 A ten ant must expect that other tenants or the landlord can and will admit other people into the common areas of his apartment building.167 The same cannot be said for a tenant's expectation that police officers will break and enter into the common areas of his apartment building.168 With regard to expectations that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,169 the Supreme Court has stated that persons who share areas with others "assume the risk" that the others may permit police officers to look inside.170 This limitation seems eminently reasonable. On the other hand, society should be prepared to recognize as reason able a tenant's expectation that government agents are not working surreptitiously to circumvent their security systems. [Vol. 101:273 individuals' privacy interests within the curtilage171 of their private homes.172 In fact, the curtilage has been considered "part of home it self for Fourth Amendment purposes."173 Consequently, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals' privacy expectations within the cur tilage itself. 174 There are, of course, exceptions, so that there is no vio lation where a police officer comes "upon the land in the same way that any member of the public could be expected to do, as by taking the normal route of access along a walkway or driveway or onto a porch."175 The case is different where an exclusionary fence protects the curtilage and officers breach this fence to conduct surveillance of persons entering and leaving a house.176
The Court's curtilage doctrine is helpful in the locked common area context for three reasons. First, it underscores the Supreme Court's special commitment to protecting privacy interests in close proximity to the home. Second, it demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment's protection of the area surrounding the home is not lim ited to preventing officers from peering into the home; rather it is aimed at protecting "the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."177 Third, it highlights the in equities of the majority approach. Those who happen to live in private houses, surrounded by private property that falls within the curtilage of these houses, enjoy the Fourth Amendment's protection of their privacy.178 Those who live in multi-unit apartment buildings, on the other hand, are stripped of their Fourth Amendment rights by virtue of the style of housing they have chosen, or have been forced, to 172. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. In California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) , the Supreme Court noted that while the curtilage was within the Fourth Amendment's protec tion, all government observation of that art;a is not necessarily barred by the Fourth Amendment. Rather, "[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been ex tended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares." Id. In this case, observation from an airplane was likened to passing by a home on a public thoroughfare. Id.
173. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 ("Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protec tion to the curtilage.").
174. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 143, § 3.2(c) (pointing out that even "entry of [a hallway in the interior of a single family dwelling] is a search"). The resulting syllogism is straightforward: The curtilage is considered part of the home. Entry into a part of the home constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, entry into the curti lage is also a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
175. Id. 177. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
178. Id.
adopt.179 That is, government agents may not, without a warrant, enter the area "immediately surrounding and associated with the home"180 if that home is a single-unit residence, but the majority of circuits permit them to enter the area "immediately surrounding and associated with the home" if that home is located within a locked apartment build ing . 181
The reasoning of one of the Court's latest significant Fourth Amendment cases, Ky llo v. Un ited States,182 also carries great weight here. At issue in this case was whether governmental use of a thermal imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat within a private home amounted to a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 183 The Court held that the use of such a device without a warrant vio lated the Fourth Amendment and refused to allow government tech nology to intrude upon citizens' privacy interests . 184 This holding "as sure[d) preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted" and interposed a neutral and detached magistrate between citizens and the desires of the police.185
Although the Court framed its holding as imposing limitations on governmental use of technology that is not in common public use,186 the Ky llo opinion must be seen as embracing more. The Court took "the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward,"187 stepping in to eliminate a significant threat to the privacy of the home posed by advancing technology. In the majority of circuits that have addressed the locked common area question, this privacy in terest is threatened to an even greater extent by another feature of 183. Ky/lo, 533 U.S. at 29 (holding that "the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home consti tutes a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"). In this case, government agents, suspicious that marijuana was being grown in the defendant's home, used a thermal imaging device to scan the home to determine whether the heat emanating from the home was consistent with the use of high intensity lamps typically used to grow marijuana indoors.
Id. at 29. On the basis of this scan, the agents obtained a search warrant for the defendant's home, and, upon executing this warrant, they found over 100 marijuana plants. Id American society -large, multi-unit apartment complexes subject to discretionary searches by police officers . In these types of cases, gov ernment officers do not just passively scan residences from a public street; instead, they physically trespass188 within private, limited-access buildings in hopes of finding contraband or other evidence of wrong doing.189 Tenants must worry, not that an officer is scanning their homes from across the street,190 but that an officer may be eavesdrop ping outside their doors or working to circumvent their security sys tems. 191 Taken together, these factors weigh heavily in favor of recognizing tenants' expectations of privacy within the locked common areas of their apartment buildings. The privacy and security interests an indi vidual has in those areas close to the home do not vanish merely be cause that person lives in an apartment complex.192 Consequently, courts should make room in their Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to protect these interests where tenants have taken precaution to ex clude unauthorized persons from the common areas of their apart ment buildings.
Ill. A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IS MOST CONSISTENT WITH THE AMENDMENT'S HISTORY AND THE FRAMERS' INTENTIONS
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment in light of the intent of its Framers and with an eye toward the history surrounding its adoption demands that the protections embodied within the Amendment be ex tended to cover the locked common areas of apartment buildings. The Framers designed the provisions of the Fourth Amendment to safe guard privacy and limit the discretion of the police,193 but the rule Although there is little agreement about how much weight should be given to the Framers' intentions, most scholars agree that it should play at least some role in constitutional interpretation.195 The Supreme Court has offered some guidance as to the role history and intent are to play in the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, stating that " [t] he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted. " 196 An examination of the Framers' primary concerns underlying their opposition to general warrants helps to inf o rm this inquiry. The pro tections embodied in the Fourth Amendment were crafted, in large part, in response to the Framers' distasteful experience with writs of assistance, 197 a Colonial term for broad and vaguely worded general warrants authorizing, for example, the search of "suspected places."198 These writs allowed government officials to search any private place at to general warrants and general searches alike rested upon broad concerns about protecting privacy, property, and liberty from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions.").
194. See supra Section I.B (discussing the rule set out by a majority of the circuits that permits police officers to search locked common areas without a warrant). example, that '[t)he writs of assistance ... were the principle grievaqce against which the fourth amendment was directed.' ").
198. Davies, supra note 193, at 558, 561 (noting that "general warrants" also referred to warrants issued without sworn complaints or to those issued without an adequate showing of cause).
[Vol. 101:273 will,199 which often resulted in the "abhorred practice of breaking in, ransacking and searching homes and other buildings and seizing peo ple's personal belongings without warrants issued by magistrates."200 Opponents vigorously protested these writs as illegal,201 and de nounced them as "the worst instance of arbitrary power, the most de structive of English liberty, that ever was found in an English law book,"202 because they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."203 The colonists did not react well to this en croachment on their liberty, and protests, riots, and refusals to comply with the writs followed with regularity.204 The reaction against these writs of assistance was so strong, and the opposition to them so great, that the Framers found it necessary to outlaw them by direct constitu tional prohibition. 205 A constitutional ban on general warrants is not unique to the United States Constitution. Rather, the Fourth Amendment's prohibi tions, like most of the first eight amendments, were recasts of provi sions already existing within state constitutions.206 One such example was the Pennsylvania Constitution, whose search and seizure provision was itself a restatement of the common law, prudently inscribed in the supreme legal document of the state as "a solemn veto against this powerful engine of despotism. "207 The Framers acted similarly on the national level, entering a solemn veto against unreasonable searches and seizures in the United States Constitution.208 Their decision to place this veto in the Constitution is significant because the notion of a constitution is colored with systemic presumptions of permanence and continuity. 209 The rule adopted by the majority of the circuits is inconsistent with this veto and flies in the face of one of the major concerns motivating the Framers to ban general warrants -the desire to protect the sanc tity of homes and secure them against government search.210 The pro hibition on search and seizure was an affirmation of the common law211 and must be viewed in light. of the special status accorded to the home at common law.212 The Supreme Court recognizes this fact213 and holds that privacy expectations are at their highest in those areas close to private homes.214 The lo�ked common areas of an apartment build ing are immediately adjacent to private homes and are unavailable to the general public. As such, tenants' privacy expectations within these areas merit recognition as legitimate interests that deserve a high level of constitutional protection.215
It is important to note that the argument for recognizing constitu tionally protected privacy interests within locked common areas does not depend upon viewing common hallways as part of tenants' homes.216 Rather, it depends upon a consideration of the privacy inter ests the Framers sought to protect, viewed in the context of modem living conditions and in light of the privacy interests of tenants in those areas in close proximity to their homes. The Massachusetts' Court of Appeals considered the scope of a person's right to privacy and secu rity in those areas surrounding the home and concluded that there is no reason why those rights should not apply in the common hallways Indeed, it is difficult to come up with a good reason for depriving tenants of their privacy and security interests. Tenants in a multi-unit apartment building have an expectation of security and privacy from trespassers,218 and to contend otherwise is to ignore the reality of a locked door guarding the common areas. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized apartments as "homes" for Fourth Amendment purposes,219 and the locked common areas of apartment buildings, re gardless of their quality or location, are not public thoroughfares.220 They are, instead, private property reasonably secured against the en try of unauthorized individuals. The Framers would, no doubt, have been shocked at the suggestion that the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to trespass into the locked entryway of a private, single family house,221 and yet a majority of the circuits hold that similar po lice action loses all significance as soon as another family or tenant is 217. In Go/doff, the issue before the court was whether an assault that occurred within the common hallway of the victim's apartment building took place within his "dwelling house." Go/doff, 510 N.E.2d at 278. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the pur pose of burglary statutes was "to prohibit that conduct which violates a person's right of se curity in a place universally associated with refuge and safety, the dwelling house." Id. at 280. The court stated:
When this historical [common law] right to security in one's place of habitation is considered in the context of contemporary multi-unit residential structures, we can think of no reason why that right should not apply to tenants who reach their apartment units by a common hallway which they have collectively secured from the general public by a Jocked door .... This reasoning applies with equal or greater force when the common areas of an apartment building (or condominium complex) are concerned.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). While the holding in Go/doff pertained to a state burglary statute, the court's reasoning as to a tenant's privacy and security interests within the locked common areas of an apartment building is strongly probative here. involved.222 The respect due the home and the area surrounding it de mands more protection than this. The rule adopted by the majority of the circuits is also at odds with another major factor motivating a constitutional ban on general war rants -the Framers' hostility to conferring discretionary search authority on common police officers. 223 The Framers were concerned about the use of general warrants, especially as used and abused by customs officials.224 Consequently, they sought to interpose a neutral magistrate between the zealous police officer and the citizen to ensure that the citizen's privacy was disturbed only when the police officer's suspicions were supported by probable cause.225 They did so because "[t]he right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the dis cretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted. "226 The Supreme Court recog nizes this fact and has been firm in maintaining that the Fourth Amendment is more than a mere formality and that the presence of a search warrant in the hands of the police serves an important pur pose.227 Nevertheless, the majority of circuits have dismissed this high function where locked apartment buildings are concerned and have vested warrantless officers with discretionary authority to search the locked common areas of apartment complexes at will.228 The Supreme Court should reject this narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and, in its place, adopt a construction that is consistent with the aims of the Framers and the history of the Amendment.
IV. SOUND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE LOCKED COMMON AREA
CONTEXT
Extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to cover the locked common areas of apartment buildings is also desirable as a matter of public policy. A broad interpretation is needed to protect tenants' legitimate privacy interests and is necessitated by a respect for the rule of law. Furthermore, broad protections provide a workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the inter ests protected by the Fourth Amendment.229 Justice Harlan urged the Court not to "merely recite ... risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society ... without at least the protection of a warrant requirement."230 Taking this counsel into consideration, it is undesirable for government officers, governed by nothing but their own discretion, to enter locked common areas through trickery, tres pass, or other disingenuous means, to peer down hallways, peek under doors, and eavesdrop outside tenants' apartments.
Extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the locked common areas of apartment buildings is needed to protect the legiti mate privacy interests of tenants in multi-unit apartment buildings. Many courts disagree with this assertion, however, finding the idea of a reasonable expectation of privacy within the common areas of a building to be counterintuitive.231 From this perspective, "[a]n expecta tion of privacy necessarily implies an expectation that one will be free of any intrusion, not merely unwarranted intrusions."232 As no single tenant has an absolute right to exclude others from the common areas, these courts see little reason for drawing artificial lines that only serve to keep police officers out.
Courts should not, however, immediately dismiss tenants' privacy interests because they are not absolute.233 In fact, arguing that locked common areas, open to use by other tenants and their guests, offer no real shield. of privacy or protection ignores reality.234 The facts of the cases cited in this Note reveal that tenants do, in fact, rely on the pri vacy and security of locked common doors and, consequently, are apt to leave their doors aj ar,235 to deposit various private items in desig-229. It is also arguable that this construction of the Fourth Amendment is needed to ensure that both rich and poor are equally protected by the Amendment. Poor tenants, es pecially minorities, are much more likely to Jive in neighborhoods subject to close police scrutiny and are, therefore, more likely to feel the sting of unbridled police discretion. ("[E]ach tenant of a building, while he has no right to exclude from the common hallways those who enter lawfully, does have a personal and constitutionally protected interest in the integrity and security of the entire building against unlawful breaking and entry."); see also supra notes 102-122 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Eisler, 567 F.2d at 816 ("The locks on the doors to the entrances of the apartment complex were to provide security to the occupants, not privacy in common hall ways.").
235. See, e.g., United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 547-48 (6th Cir. 1976).
nated storage areas,236 or to leave items stored at the end of hallways or stairwells.237 Courts should recognize that many Americans do not live in single-family homes238 and should interpret the Constitution to protect these individuals' privacy interests against uninvited or unwar ranted intrusions.
In addition to a concern for protecting tenants' legitimate expecta tions of privacy, a due respect for the rule of law demands that the Court recognize tenants' privacy interests within the locked common areas of their apartment buildings. Since the inception of this nation, Americans have taken pride in the fact that the American system of government embodies the rule of law, and not of men.239 This principle is jeopardized, however, when courts conclude that, in the interest of efficient law enforcement, police officers may violate the law to secure arrests and convictions. 240 In fact, Justice Brandeis cautioned that the very existence of ordered government is endangered when the gov ernment fails to adhere faithfully to its own laws.241 He further warned that when "the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds con tempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it in vites anarchy." 242 For too long, courts have, in the name of safety and efficiency, permitted police officers to enter and search the locked common areas of apartment complexes without the protection of a warrant. They reason that permitting police to conduct discretionary searches of locked common areas strikes the optimal balance, for it gives tenants beneficial police protection within these areas, while at the same time preserving the privacy of their actual homes, that is, their apart- [Vol. 101:273 ments.243 It is indeed laudable that courts have stopped short of strip ping tenants of all their privacy interests, but this rationale alone can not be seen as a justification for stripping tenants of their privacy and security interests within the locked common areas of their apartment buildings.244 It is no answer to a constitutional complaint to respond that a particular government action results in greater police protection for society. Justice Douglas warned that this kind of compromise is detrimental to the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and stated that a strict construction of the Fourth Amendment is needed to protect citizens from the onslaught of a government concerned predominately with efficiency and order.245 A meaningful application of the Fourth Amendment reveals that tenants do have an expectation of privacy that society should recognize as reasonable.246 The Supreme Court should heed Justice Douglas' warning and remain vigilant in jealously protecting citizens' Fourth Amendment rights.
Finally, interpreting the Fourth Amendment to protect tenants' privacy interests is compatible with the Supreme Court's concern with providing "a workable accommodation between the needs of law en forcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment."247 Extending the scope of the Fourth Amendment to cover the locked common hallways of an apartment complex is not unduly restrictive because officers remain free to enter and search the locked common areas of apartment complexes with authorization from a tenant, land lord, or magistrate.248 Requiring police officers to obtain permission 244. In any question of constitutional interpretation in light of countervailing social in terests, it is essential to remember that "grave threats to liberty often come in times of ur gency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.'' Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In Justice Douglas's words:
[T]he concepts of privacy ... enshrined in the Fourth Amendment vanish completely when we slavishly allow an all-powerful government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and other benign purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to shield them from the pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them the health and strength to carry on. That is why a 'strict construction' of the Fourth Amendment is necessary if every man's liberty and privacy are to be constitutionally honored. before passing through a locked door cannot be seen as any more un reasonable than the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment itself. Law enforcement needs are adequately served because police remain unaffected in "hot pursuit" cases249 and in other exigent cir cumstances. 250 This rule is preferable to that adopted by a majority of the circuits because it lays down a clearly defined boundary line while at the same time protecting tenants' privacy interests. While other circuits boast that their rule is desirable because it is easy f o r officers to understand and apply,251 it is unclear why a more protective rule would not be just as easy for police officers to comprehend. In fact, the rule to the con trary is quite simple. If a door is locked, a police officer must obtain permission or a warrant before he or she goes inside. Any officer in the field can comprehend this rule,252 and its application would impede law enforcement efforts only where those efforts unreasonably inter fered with constitutionally protected interests.
In short, society should not, as a matter of constitutional law and public policy, declare that tenants who choose to live in multi-unit apartment complexes, with the inherent loss of privacy that results from a mutual toleration of other tenants and their guests, conse quently forfeit all legitimate claims to privacy in these common areas. The protections of the Fourth Amendment are stronger than that,253 and the Court ought not allow the constitutional protections that safe guard an individual's privacy and security to be overcome so easily.254 This rule ... lays down a clearly-defined boundary line for constitutionally permissible po lice action, which is readily apparent to an officer in the field, without a need for counting apartments, analyzing common-hallway traffic patterns or interpreting the mental processes of a suspect relating to an area used in common with others. 
